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Abstract
Artificial intelligence comes with great opportuni-
ties and but also great risks. We investigate to what
extent deep learning can be used to create and de-
tect deceptive explanations that either aim to lure
a human into believing a decision that is not truth-
ful to the model or provide reasoning that is non-
faithful to the decision. Our theoretical insights
show some limits of deception and detection in the
absence of domain knowledge. For empirical eval-
uation, we focus on text classification. To create
deceptive explanations, we alter explanations orig-
inating from GradCAM, a state-of-art technique for
creating explanations in neural networks. We eval-
uate the effectiveness of deceptive explanations on
200 participants. Our findings indicate that de-
ceptive explanations can indeed fool humans. Our
classifier can detect even seemingly minor attempts
of deception with accuracy that exceeds 80% given
sufficient domain knowledge encoded in the form
of training data.
1 Introduction
Because of the limited moderation of online content, attempts
at deception proliferate. Online media struggle against the
plague of “fake news”, and e-commerce sites spend consid-
erable effort in detecting deceptive product reviews. For ex-
ample, marketing strategies exist that consider the creation
of fake reviews to make products appear better or to provide
false claims about product quality [Adelani et al., 2019].
One can consider other examples of why to provide “al-
tered” explanations of a predictive system. Explanations
might allow to re-engineer the logic of the AI system, i.e.,
leak intellectual property. Decision makers might also devi-
ate from suggested AI decisions at will, eg. a bank employee
might deny a loan to a person she dislikes claiming an AI
model’s recommendation as reason (irrespective of the actual
recommendation of the system) with a made-up explanation.
The learning process of AI systems might yield systems with
better performance when utilizing information that should not
be used but is available. For example, basing hiring decisions
∗Contact Author
on gender or ethnicity is forbidden in many countries, but us-
ing it might yield better job performance predictions of appli-
cants. As such there may be an incentive to build systems that
utilize such information, but hide its use. That is, “illegal”
decision criteria are used but they are omitted from explana-
tions requested by authorities or even citizens. In Europe,
the GDPR law grants such rights to individuals for decisions
made in an automated manner.
Frequently, both the decision and the explanation are gen-
erated automatically. However, generating explanations is
far from trivial. AI systems, commonly based on deep
learning, are often very complex consisting of millions of
neurons. Still, in recent years there has been tremendous
effort in creating methods for improving transparency of
such “black boxes” via explanations [Schneider and Han-
dali, 2019]. Evaluations in the context of textual explana-
tion [Lertvittayakumjorn and Toni, 2019] show that automat-
ically generated explanations are deemed helpful for certain
tasks. Thus, given economic incentives to provide incorrect
explanations, the question arises, whether humans can be de-
ceived by automatically generated explanations and to what
extent deceptive explanations can be detected.
In this work, we are interested in the automatic generation
of explanations supporting deception either by providing in-
correct explanations for a correct decision or by generating an
explanation for an incorrect decision. We focus on the case,
where a recipient might be able to detect a lie by critically
examining an explanation, the decision and the information
used for decision-making. For illustration, for product re-
views, a person may be lured to believe that a review is posi-
tive despite it being negative. To this end, the person might be
shown the entire review, but seemingly positive terms could
be highlighted to give the impression of being positive, while
negative terms are left unremarkable.
2 Problem Statement
A machine learning (ML) model M maps an input X ∈ S
to an output Y , where S is the set of all possible inputs. An
explainee (the recipient of an explanation) obtains for an in-
put X , a decision D and an explanation H that is allegedly
capturing the model behavior. The decision D is claimed to
be the model’s prediction Y = M(X). The goal of a de-
ceiver is to construct an explanation so that the explainee is
neither suspicious about the decision in case it is not truthful
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Figure 1: Scenarios for reported predictions and explanations
to the model (D 6= M(X)) nor about the explanation H , if
it deviates from the ground-truth explanation (H 6= H∗) that
precisely provides the reasoning of the model (see Figure 1).
An input X consists of values for n features, F = {i|i =
1 . . . n}, where each feature i has a single value xi ∈ Vi of a
set of feasible values Vi. For example, an input X can be a
text document, where each feature i is a word specified by
a word id xi. Documents X ∈ S are extended or cut to
a fixed length n. The reported decision D(X) might differ
from the model decision Y = M(X). We assume that there
is an oracle that provides ground-truth explanations H∗ de-
scribing why a model M would output Y ′ for input X , ie.
H∗M (X,Y
′). We omit M (if clear in a context) and assume
Y ′ = D(X), if not stated otherwise, ie. write H∗(X). Note
that the oracle can provide explanations for a hypothetical de-
cision D(X) 6= M(X), ie. “Given that the model decided
D(X) 6= M(X), what would have made it do so?”. To this
date, there might not be an oracle that outputs a “perfect” ex-
planation according to an individual’s judgement [Schneider
and Handali, 2019]. Thus, we use a proxy method that aims
to give truthful explanations and behaves in a known, pre-
dictable manner such as LIME [Ribeiro et al., 2016] or Grad-
CAM [Selvaraju et al., 2017]. While ML models might learn
a hierarchy of features, explaining in terms of learnt features
is challenging, since they might not be mapped easily to fea-
tures or concepts that are humanly understandable. Thus, we
focus on explanations that assign relevance scores to features
F of an input X . Formally, we consider explanations H(X)
that output a value H(X)i for each feature i ∈ F . Where
H(X)i > 0 implies that feature i with value xi is supportive
of decision D(X). A value of zero implies no dependence of
i on the decision Y . H(X)i < 0 shows that another decision
is supported.
2.1 Explanation Faithfulness
We measure faithfulness of an explanation using two metrics,
namely decision fidelity and oracle fidelity.
Decision fidelity. It amounts to the standard notion of
quantifying whether input X and explanation H(X,D(X))
on their own allow to derive the model decision Y =
M(X) [Schneider and Handali, 2019]. Therefore, if reported
decisions D(X) differ from model decisions D(X) 6=M(x)
or explanations are indicative of multiple outputs, this is
hardly possible. Decision fidelity fD can be defined as the
loss when predicting the outcome using some classifier g
based on the explanation only, or formally:
fD(X) = −L(g(H,X), Y ) (1)
Figure 2: Deviations from ground truth, ie. oracle explanationH∗.
The loss might be defined as 0 if g(H,X) = Y and 1 oth-
erwise. We assume that the oracle explanations H∗ result in
minimum loss, ie. maximum decision fidelity. (Large) deci-
sion fidelity does not require that an explanation contains all
relevant features used to derive the decision D. For example,
in a hiring process, gender might influence the decision, but
for a particular candidate other factors, such as qualification,
social skills etc., are dominant and on their own unquestion-
ably lead to a hiring decision.
Oracle fidelity. This refers to the overlap of a ground-truth
explanation of an oracle H∗ with the (potentially deceptive)
explanation H for an input X and reported decision D(X).
Any mismatch of a feature in the explanation H and H∗ low-
ers oracle fidelity. It is defined as:
fO(X) = 1− ‖H
∗(X)−H(X)‖
‖H∗(X)‖ (2)
Note, that even if the decision D(X) is non-truthful to the
model, ie. D(X) 6= M(X), oracle fidelity might be large,
if the explanation correctly outputs the reasoning that would
lead to the reported decision. In the case that the reported de-
cision is truthful, ie. D(X) = M(X), there seems to be an
obvious correlation between decision- and oracle fidelity. But
any arbitrarily small deviation of oracle fidelity from the max-
imum of 1 does not necessarily ensure large decision fidelity
and vice versa. For example, assume that the explanation H
systematically under- or overstates the relevance of features,
ie. H(X)i = H(X)i · ci with arbitrary ci > 0 and ci 6= 1.
For ci differing significantly from 1, this leads to explanations
that are far from the truth, which is captured by low oracle fi-
delity. However, decision fidelity might yield the opposite
picture, ie. maximum decision fidelity, since a classifier g
(Def. 1) trained on inputs (X,H) with labels D(X), might
learn the coefficients ci and predict labels without errors.
Oracle fidelity captures the degree of deceptiveness of ex-
planation H by aggregating the differences of its relevances
of features and those of a hypothesized perfect explanation
H∗. When looking at individual features from a layperson’s
perspective, deception can arise due to over- and understating
the feature’s relevance or even fabricating features (see Fig-
ure 2). In this work, we do not consider fabricating by (input)
feature invention. Omission and inverting of features can be
viewed as special cases of over- and understating.
2.2 Purposes of Deceptive Explanation
Some purposes of a deceptive explanation are:
Figure 3: Inputs and outputs for deceiver and explainee for scenario
FT in Figure 1. Images by [Petsiuk et al., 2018].
(i) Convincing the explainee of an incorrect prediction, ie.
that a model decided D for an input X although the
model’s output is Y =M(X) with Y 6= D.
(ii) Providing an explanation that does not accurately cap-
ture model behavior without creating suspicion. An in-
correct explanation will manifest in low decision fidelity
and oracle fidelity. It involves hiding or overstating the
importance of features in the decision process (Figure 2)
with more holistic goals such as:
a) Omission: Hiding that decisions are made based on
specific attributes such as gender or race to prevent legal
consequences or a loss in reputation.
b) Obfuscation: Hiding the decision mechanism of the
algorithm to protect intellectual property.
The combination of (i) and (ii) leads to the four scenarios
shown in Figure 1.
To construct deceptive explanations (and decisions), a de-
ceiver has access to the model M , the input X and outputs
a decision D in combination with an explanation H(X) (see
Figure 3). Deceptive explanations are constructed to maxi-
mize the explainee’s credence of decisions and explanations.
We assume that an explainee is most confident that an or-
acle explanation H∗(X,Y ) and the model based decision
Y = M(X) are correct. The explainee might rely not just
on a single explanation and decision for one input X ∈ S,
but reason using explanations and decisions of multiple in-
puts S′ ⊆ S.
2.3 Detection Problem
We consider two detection problems:
Max-credence Problem. The goal is to maximize the per-
centage of decisions and explanations that are identified cor-
rectly either as truthful (TT in Figure 1) or otherwise.
Concept Fidelity Problem. The goal is to compute the ex-
pected oracle fidelity of a feature value v:
fO(v) :=
∑
i,X∈F(v,S)
fO(X)i
|F(v, S)| with (3)
F(v, T ) := {(j,X)|xj = v,X = (xi), X ∈ T} (4)
F(v, T ) denotes the set of all inputs in set T ⊆ S and their
features with value v. Concept fidelity allows, for example,
to check if features are omitted. Say that values V ′ ⊆ Vi
are related to gender or race, eg. V ′ = {male, female}.
To assess if values V ′ impact decisions, explainees have to
assess that they are not reported as relevant in explanations,
ie. H(X)i = 0 for all inputs (i,X) ∈ F(v, T ) an all v ∈ V ′,
and that they have maximum oracle fidelity, ie. fO(X)i = 1
.
3 Classification and Explanation
We elaborate on two text classification tasks using a con-
volutional neural network (CNN) for text classification by
Kim [2014] and GradCAM [Selvaraju et al., 2017] for gen-
erating oracle explanations. The CNN is well-established,
conceptually simple and works reasonably well. GradCAM
was one of the methods said to have passed elementary san-
ity checks that many other methods did not [Adebayo et al.,
2018]. While GradCAM is most commonly employed for
CNN on image recognition the mechanisms for texts are iden-
tical. In fact, [Lertvittayakumjorn and Toni, 2019] showed
that GradCAM on CNNs similar to the one by Kim [2014]
leads to outcomes on human tasks that are comparable to
other explanation methods such as LIME.
The GradCAM method, which serves as our oracle ex-
planation H∗, computes a gradient-weighted activation map
starting from a given layer or neuron within that layer back
to the input X . To obtain an oracle explanation H∗(X,Y ′),
we use the neuron before the softmax layer that represents the
class Y ′ to explain. For generating a high fidelity explanation
for an incorrectly reported predictions D(X) 6= M(X) (sce-
nario FT in Figure 1) we provide as explanation the oracle
explanation, ie. H(X,D(X)) = H∗(X,D(X)). By defini-
tion oracle explanations maximize oracle fidelity fO.
For scenarios involving non-truthful explanations (TF and
FF) a deceiver aims at over-, understating or omitting features
X ′ ⊆ X that are problem or instance specific. To obtain
non-truthful explanations we alter oracle explanations in two
ways:
Definition 1 (Omission). Remove a fixed set of values V so
that no feature i has a value xi ∈ V as follows:
HOmit(X)i :=
{
0, if xi ∈ V.
H∗(X)i, otherwise.
(5)
In our context, this means denying the relevance of some
words V related to concepts such as gender or race. The next
alteration distorts relevance scores of all features, eg. to pre-
vent re-engineering through obfuscation.
Definition 2 (Noise addition). Add noise in a multiplicative
manner for any explanation H∗(X):
HNoise(X)i := H
∗(X)i · (1 + ri,X), (6)
where ri,X is chosen uniformly at random in [−k, k] for a
parameter k for each feature i and input X ∈ S.
4 Detection
Ideally, any of the four types of deception (see Figure 1) are
detected using only one or more inputs S′ ⊆ S and their
responses D(X) and H(X) for X ∈ S′ (see Figure 3). But,
without additional domain knowledge or context information,
it is impossible to distinguish among the four scenarios for
all deception attempts. This follows since data, such as class
labels, bear no meaning on their own. Thus, any form of
“consistent” lying is successful, eg. always claiming that a
cat is a dog (using explanations for class dog) and a dog is a
cat (using explanations for class cat) is non-detectable.
Theorem 1. There exist non-truthful reported decisions
D(X) 6=M(X) that cannot be identified as non-truthful.
Proof. Consider a model M for dataset {(X,Y )} for bi-
nary classification with class labels Y ∈ {0, 1} with
D(X) = M(X). Assume a deceiver switches the deci-
sion of model M , ie. it returns D(X) = 1 − M(X) and
H∗(X,M(X),M). Consider a dataset with switched la-
bels, ie. {(X, 1 − Y )} and a second model M ′ that is
identical to M except that it outputs M ′(X) = 1 − Y =
1−M(X). Thus, oracle explanation are identical, ie. we have
H∗(X,M ′(X),M ′) = H∗(X,M(X),M). Thus, for input
X both the deceiver and modelM ′ reportD(X) = 1−M(X)
and H∗(X,M(X),M). Therefore, they cannot be distin-
guished by any detector.
A similar theorem might be stated for non-truthful expla-
nations H 6= H∗, eg. by using feature inversion H(X) =
−H∗(X).
Next, we provide methods to detect some forms of decep-
tions without and with domain knowledge, ie. human la-
beled training data. More precisely, for the max-credence
problem we use a supervised learning approach. That is,
we are given a training set, where each sample consists of
the three inputs (H(X,D), X , D) together with label L ∈
{TT, FT, TF, FF} stating the scenario in Figure 1. Thus,
our goal is to develop a classifier maximizing deception de-
tection accuracy.
For the concept fidelity problem, computing fO(v) is dif-
ficult, since it requires oracle explanations H∗. Therefore,
we aim at an approximate, surrogate measure that might only
help in identifying features that are possibly misrepresented
in the explanations. Our idea is partially motivated by the
following theorem stating that one cannot hide that a feature
(value) is influential, if the exchange of the value with another
value leads to a change in decision.
Theorem 2. Omission of at least one feature value v ∈ V can
be detected, if there are instances X,X ′ ∈ S with decisions
D(X) 6= D(X ′) and X ′ = X except for one feature j with
xj , x
′
j ∈ V and x′j 6= xj .
Proof. We provide a constructive argument. We can compute
for each input X ∈ S, the prediction D(X) and explanation
H(X). By Definition 1, if feature values V are omitted it
must hold H(X)i = 0 for all (i,X) ∈ FS,v and v ∈ V .
Omission occurred if this is violated or there are X,X ′ ∈ S
that differ only in the value xj ∈ V for feature j andM(X) 6=
M(X ′). The latter holds because the change in decision must
be attributed to a non-zero relevance of xj ∈ V or x′j ∈ V ,
since X and X ′ are identical except for feature j with values
that are deemed omitted.
The proof of Theorem 2 is constructive, but generally all
possible inputs S cannot be evaluated due to computational
costs. Furthermore, the existence of inputs X,X ′ ∈ S that
only differ in a specific feature is not guaranteed. Therefore,
we rely on the idea that if a feature i, ie. its value, is re-
ported to be highly relevant, ie. H(X)i is large, then remov-
ing, adding or changing a feature i with value xi = v should
more likely result in a change of prediction than feature val-
ues that are deemed less relevant. Computation is related to
the Shapley value. For our text classification, we define the
average explanation relevance for a specific value, ie. word
v, for a subset of inputs S′ ⊆ S as follows:
H(v, S′) :=
∑
(j,X′)∈F(v,S′) |H(X ′)j |
|F(v, S′)| (7)
Addition of a word v to samples S′v/∈S′ that do not contain
word v is done by replacing a random feature value with v.
LetX+v be the sample that results from changingX ∈ S′v/∈S′
by such a replacement. We compute the accuracy A+(v) due
to adding v by replacement, ie. how many predictions M(X)
and M(X+v) match for X ∈ S′v/∈S′ .1
We use the accuracy A+(v) and the average explanation
relevance H(v, S′) to coarsely estimate fO(v). The more
likely a point (A+(v), H(S′v)) is an outlier, the larger fO(v)
is expected to be.
5 Empirical Investigation
We evaluate generation of deceptive explanations and their
detection. For detection, we conduct a user study and also use
ML models. We assume that only features that are claimed to
contribute positively to a decision are included in explana-
tions. That is, features that are claimed to be irrelevant or
even supporting of another possible decision outcome are ig-
nored. The motivation is that we aim at explanations that are
as simple for a human to understand as possible.
5.1 Setup
We employed two datasets. The IMDB dataset [Maas et al.,
2011] consisting of movie reviews and a label indicating sen-
timent polarity, ie. either positive or negative. We also uti-
lized the Web of Science (WoS) dataset consisting of abstracts
of scientific papers classified into 7 categories (Psychology,
Medical Science, Civil Engineering, Mechanical Engineer-
ing, Computer Science and Electrical Engineering) [Kowsari
et al., 2017]. Our CNNs for classification achieved accura-
cies of 87% for IMDB and 75% for WoS trained using the
AdamOptimizer for 300 epochs with 2/3 of the samples for
training and 1/3 for testing. We computed explanations for
test data only.
5.2 Human-based Detection
We conducted a user study using the IMDB dataset (Sec-
tion 5.1).2 For the scenarios of interest, we compare expla-
nations which are aligned to the shown prediction, ie. TT and
FT. Two samples are shown in Figure 4.
1Removal is analogous. It is not considered due to space.
2The WoS dataset seems less suited, since it uses expert termi-
nology that is often not held by the general public from which par-
ticipants originate as found in [Lertvittayakumjorn and Toni, 2019]
Figure 4: Generated sample explanations for scenarios TT (top) and
FT (bottom) from Figure 1
Participants. We recruited a total of 200 participants on
Amazon Mechanical Turk from the US having at least a high-
school degree. We presented each participant 25 predictions
together with explanations for each dataset. We randomized
the choice of presented samples, ie. we randomly chose a
dataset, randomly chose a sample of the dataset, randomly
chose between scenarios TT and FT in Figure 1.
5.3 Machine Learning-based Detection
For the detection experiment, we chose samples that were
predicted correctly by our trained classifier. We investigate
detection of deceptive explanations using several methods on
all four scenarios in Figure 1 under the following criteria. We
omitted a randomly chosen set of words V (see Def. 1), such
that their overall contribution to all explanations H∗ is k%
(with a tolerance of 0.01k %). The contribution of a word
v is given by
∑
(i,X)∈F(v,S)H
∗(X,M(X))i. For explana-
tion distortion parameter k (see Definitions 1 and 2) we used
both 0.01 and 0.25 (both noise and omission). Since labeling
is difficult and potentially error-prone, we consider different
levels of label noise, ie. L ∈ [0, 0.32] such that a fraction L of
all labels were replaced with a random label (different from
the correct one).
Models. For the Random Forest model we chose 1000 trees
of depth 12. The model input is a concatenation of three vec-
tors: i) a textvector of word indices, ii) a heatmap vector of
values obtained via GradCAM, that is a 1:1 mapping of the
visual output shown to the user, and iii) a one-hot predic-
tion vector of the decision. The CNN classifier is designed
as follows: we modified the CNN for text classification by
concatenating the heatmap vector with the word embedding
before the convolution layer. The one-hot prediction vector is
then concatenated with the output of the convolution layer.
5.4 Heuristic-based Detection
The text classifier considered the 20,000 most common
words. We randomly selected 3,000 out of the 20,000 words
to investigate their impact on the decision if they are omitted
and added.
6 Results
6.1 Human-based Detection
Out of the 200 participants, we removed participants that
spend less than 5 seconds per question, since we deemed this
time too short to provide a reasonable answer. We also filtered
Figure 5: Distributions of user replies to “The classification is cor-
rect” (1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree).
out participants who always gave the same answer for all 25
questions. This left 133 participants amounting to 3,500 an-
swers shown in Figure 5 for both scenarios.
A t-test of means confirmed that the distributions differ
significantly (p-value of 0.008), though the mean scores of
3.74(TT) and 3.58(FT) show that in absolute terms differ-
ences are minor. This implies that while the majority of hu-
mans might be fooled often times, they have the capability to
collectively detect deceptive explanations.
6.2 Machine Learning-based Detection
Figure 6 suggests that without label noise, under all scenar-
ios, accuracy exceeds 90% for correctly deciding whether a
decision and/or explanation are deceptive. Accuracy worsens
under greater label noise though even for a noise level of 32%
it is better than chance. The more extreme the distortion of
explanations, ie. the larger k, the higher detection accuracy.
But even for minor modifications, ie. adding just 1% of noise
on the explanation and omitting only words contributing to
1% of the total explanation, accuracy exceeds 80% under low
label noise (L = 0.01). The only case in which this is non-
obvious is the scenario TFNoise (in Figure 6), ie. decisions
are correct and explanations are not due to noise. In that case,
for explanations altered with little noise both classifiers are
considerably worse than the trivial baseline of 50% accuracy.
Both overfit the data in these cases. That is, training accu-
racies (not shown) are much higher than test accuracies. For
larger noise levels (k = 0.25), random forests perform much
better. CNNs also do well for k = 1, where test accuracies
exceded 90%. Comparing random forests and CNNs, CNNs
seem to perform better in cases, where the prediction is in-
correct. It seems that CNNs are able to learn the relation of
inputs X to decision D(X) without much need for an expla-
nation. This is supported by the observation that the degree
of deception manifested in the explanations has limited im-
pact on the performance. In contrast, random forests seem to
rely more on explanations. They perform better in situations
where decisions are truthful, but explanations are not.
6.3 Heuristic-based Detection
The scatter plots in Figure 7 highlight that feature values v
with larger relevance H have stronger impact on the decision.
All explanations are truthful. Any point, ie. word, that is out-
side the dense area in any of the plots is a potential candidate
for not being truthfully represented in the explanations. For
example, the fictitious point (H,A+) = (0.2, 0.85) for the
Figure 6: ML-based detection results for scenarios in Figure 1
Figure 7: Plot of WoS data(left) and IMDB(right)
IMDB dataset poses an outlier that might well stem from de-
ceptive explanations. Thus, while deceptions of feature val-
ues leading to large impact on accuracy might be well visible,
those that have only small impact on accuracy might not be.
7 Related Work
[Viering et al., 2019] are interested in manipulating the in-
ner workings of a CNN, so that it outputs arbitrary explana-
tions. Whether the explanations themselves are convincing or
not, is not considered, ie. the paper shows many examples of
“incredible” explanations that can easily be detected as non-
genuine. Lakkaraju and Bastani [2019] investigated the ef-
fectiveness of misleading explanations to manipulate user’s
trust. Decisions were made using prohibited features such as
gender and race but misleading explanations were supposed
to disguise their usage. Their study found that users can be
manipulated into trusting high fidelity but misleading expla-
nations for correct predictions. Their setup pertains to one
of our four scenarios, ie. FT. In contrast to this work, they
have a more domain expert-oriented and problem specific fo-
cus. They lack automatic detection and the concept of oracle
fidelity. Papenmeier et al. [2019] investigated the influence
of classifier accuracy and explanation fidelity on user trust.
For three classifiers (differing strongly in test accuracy), they
considered “random” explanations, ie. using randomly cho-
sen features, and “oracle” explanations, ie. explanation made
by an automatic method. They found that accuracy is more
relevant for trust than explanation quality though both matter.
[Nourani et al., 2019] investigated upon the impact of ex-
planations on trust. Poor explanations indeed reduce a user’s
perceived accuracy of the model, independent of its actual
accuracy. Explanations’ helpfulness varies depending on task
and method [Lertvittayakumjorn and Toni, 2019]. Explana-
tions are more helpful in assessing a model’s predictions com-
pared to its behaviour. Some methods support some tasks bet-
ter than others. For instance, LIME provides the most class
discriminating evidence, while the layer-wise relevance prop-
agation (LRP) method [Bach et al., 2015] helps in assessing
uncertain predictions.
[Adelani et al., 2019] showed how to create and detect
fake online reviews of a pre-specified sentiment. In contrast,
we do not generate fake reviews but only generate misleading
justifications for review classifications. Fake news detection
has also been studied[Pe´rez-Rosas et al., 2017] based on ML
methods and linguistic features obtained through dictionar-
ies. Linguistic cues [Ludwig et al., 2016] such as flattery was
used to detect deception in e-mail communication. We do
not encode explicit, domain-specific detection features such
as flattery.
Our methods might be valuable for the detection of fairness
and bias – see [Mehrabi et al., 2019] for a recent overview.
There are attempts to prevent machine learning techniques
from making decisions based on certain attributes in the data,
such as gender or race [Ross et al., 2017] or to detect learnt
biases based on representations [Zhang et al., 2018] or per-
turbation analysis for social associations [Prabhakaran et al.,
2019]. In our case, direct access to the decision-making sys-
tem is not possible — neither during training nor during op-
erations, but we utilize explanations.
In human-to-human interaction behavioral cues such as re-
sponse times [Levine, 2014] or non-verbal leakage due to fa-
cial expressions [Ekman and Friesen, 1969] might have some,
but arguably limited impact [Masip, 2017] on deception de-
tection. In our context, this might pertain, eg. to compu-
tation time. We do not use such information. Explanations
to support deceptions typically suffer from at least one fal-
lacy such as “the use of invalid or otherwise faulty reason-
ing” [Van Eemeren et al., 2009]. Humans can use numerous
techniques to attack fallacies [Damer, 2013], often based on
logical reasoning. Such techniques might also be valuable in
our context. In particular, ML techniques have been used to
detect lies in human-interaction, eg. [Aroyo et al., 2018].
8 Conclusions
Given economic and other incentives, we believe that an-
other cat and mouse game between “liars” and “detectors”
will emerge in the context of AI. Our work provided a first
move in this game: We contributed by showing that detec-
tion of deception attempts without domain knowledge is not
always possible. But machine learning models utilizing do-
main knowledge through training data yield good detection
accuracy.
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